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1. Introduction 
The concept of horizontal equity has long had a special place in public 
finance. In particular, the imposition of a random tax would generally be 
viewed to be unfair. Most economists would say that such a tax is 
‘horizontally inequitable’. More sophisticated economists might distinguish 
between ex ante horizontal equity and ex post horizontal equity: if the tax 
were applied in a truly random way, then ex ante it would be horizontally 
equitable; individuals with identical utility functions and endowments would 
have identical ex ante expected utility, since they all face equal chances; ex 
post, it would be horizontally inequitable since individuals with the same 
endowments and tastes may have very different values of realized utility. But 
most economists would agree with Musgrave (1976) that it is ex post 
horizontal equity in which we are interested. (These arguments cannot be 
pushed too far: the draft lottery can be thought of as a random tax applied 
to a particular subgroup of the population, and it did receive widespread ~ 
though far from universal - acceptance.) 
Indeed, so basic is the notion of horizontal equity that it is incorporated in 
the Constitution of the United States in the ‘equal protection clause’. The 
*This paper is a revised version of IMSSS Technical Report no. 214 [Stiglitz (1976a)]. Since 
this paper was written closely parallel results to those reported in section 4 were independently 
derived by Weiss (1976). The author is particularly indebted to extended discussions with 
Richard Arnott and Gary Yohe. I should also like to acknowledge helpful discussions with 
Frank Hahn, David Newbery, James Mirrlees, Harvey Rosen, David Bevan, Tony Atkinson and 
Barry Nalebuff. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Warwick Summer 
Workshop (1976). to the Mathematical Economics Seminar at Oxford, and to the Public 
Finance Seminar at Princeton. I am indebted to the participants at these seminars for their 
helpful comments. Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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government may not treat differently individuals who are, for the purposes at 
hand, otherwise identical. 
Horizontal equity is usually presented as a principle in its own right. It is 
not derived from other principles. Nor is there any discussion of the 
relationship of this principle with other principles. For instance, is it ever 
inconsistent with Pareto optimality? If it is, does one of the principles have 
priority over the other? 
In recent years there has developed a large literature on optimal tax 
structures, using a utilitarian (or more general, social welfare) criterion.’ This 
approach provides a simple and useful framework within which alternative 
structures can be evaluated. Most of this literature has, however, ignored the 
question of horizontal equity. ’ The question naturally arises: Can the 
principle of horizontal equity be derived from a utiliarian (or more general 
social wefare) criterion? 
The object of this paper is to show that it cannot.3 Indeed, we establish 
that the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent with 
utilitarianism. That is to say, social welfare (as measured by the sum of 
utilities) is higher if individuals who have the same tastes and the same 
endowments are treated differently. 4 Even more strongly, we show that 
horizontal equity may be inconsistent with the principle of Pareto optimality.5 
Most of our analysis is focused on the desirability of random taxation. We 
show that random taxation may lead to a Pareto improvement. The 
implications of our analysis extend, however, to a wide variety of social 
decisions. Thus, in section 6 we present several other contexts in which 
horizontal equity is either inconsistent with social welfare maximization 
(utilitarianism) or with Pareto optimality, and in section 9 we discuss briefly 
the implications of our results for earlier analyses of optimal tax structures. 
Our analysis also has implications for pricing policies of monopolists: in 
section 8 we show that it may be desirable for regulated and unregulated 
monopolists to randomize prices. 
‘See, for instance, Ramsey (1927) Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Mirrlees (1971). In these papers, the government is assumed to 
seek, within a certain class of tax structures, that which maximizes, ciuj, where ui is the utility 
of the jth individual, or more generallv, an individualistic social welfare function of the form 
w(u’,. .:,uj,.. .) where dw/duj>O,-and w-is a concave function of its arguments. More recently, 
Stiglitz (1982a) has attempted to characterize the set of Pareto efficient tax structures. 
*With some exceptions. See Stiglitz (1972) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980). 
3At least from the form of utilitarianism represented in the optimal tax literature. See below, 
section 9. 
4The same results may be obtained with other social welfare functions as well. 
‘That horizontal equity may not be consistent with Pareto optimality is perhaps not as 
surprising as it first sounds -- the familiar story of the two shipwrecked sailors with only 
enough food for one (so horizontal equity entails both dying) at least shows the possibility of a 
contradiction. We are suggesting that conflict among these principles is more common than such 
examples may suggest. 
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We conclude with some speculative remarks about the implications of our 
results for the role of the concept of horizontal equity in the analysis of 
questions of public policy. 
2. Utilitarianism and horizontal equity: The conventional view 
The intuitive derivation of the principle of horizontal equity from 
utilitarianism is a special application of Lerner’s (1944) argument for 
progressive taxation. Assume two individuals A and B have identical incomes 
and utility functions: 
U”(C”) = U”(C”), if CA = CB, 
where C’ is the ith individual’s consumption: 




subject to the revenue constraint 
T*+T’zR, 
it is clear that if U”’ ~0, i.e. there is diminishing marginal utility of income, 
optimality entails CA = CB (see fig. 1). Thus, if Y* = YB, 
T* = TB. 
with random tax 
Y-T-A Y-T Y-T+A 
Fig. 1. 
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so that equal taxes are paid by identical individuals. Concavity (in this case 
of the utility function) implies equality and, as most readers of Samuelson’s 
Foundations will attest, every well-behaved problem is concave. The modern 
corollary of Marshall’s dictum that nature abhors discontinuities is that 
nature abhors non-concavities, and it is this, I suspect, that provides the 
intuitive rationale for the widespread belief in equality and the belief that the 
belief in equality can be justified by utilitarianism.6 
It is my belief, on the contrary, that a variety of problems of economic 
interest exhibit non-concavities of the sort that imply that social welfare 
maximization may require unequal treatment of equals. Such is the case of 
indirect taxation to which we now turn. 
We consider two versions of the problem of random taxation. In the first, 
the individual knows his tax rate before he decides on his labor inputs, in the 
second, he is only told his tax rate after he has supplied his labor (although 
he knows the probability distribution of tax rates before he decides on his 
labor supply). In both cases, randomization may be desirable, although the 
conditions under which it will be desirable differ in the two cases. In both 
cases we focus on the desirability of a small degree of randomization; that is, 
we provide conditions in which a slight randomization in the tax rate would 
lead to Pareto improvement (in terms of ex ante expected utility). It should 
be noted that there may be cases where a slight randomization would not be 
desirable, but a ‘large’ randomization would. Thus, the case for 
randomization of taxes is stronger than that presented here. 
3. Randomization of taxes prior to labor decision 
3.1. The model 
In this and the next section we consider the simplest possible model of 
indirect taxation: there is a single good (C) and labor (L). We assume that in 
the absence of taxation, the wage is unity and the price of output is unity 
(this is just a normalization) and the output is proportional to labor input. 
Let z be the tax rate and p the (after-tax) price of consumption goods 
(relative to labor numeraire). Then’ 
p=l+z. (1) 
%tce, as we shall show, this belief is not correct, one can only surmise why someone might 
have come to such a belief. Talks with economists at a large number of institutions lead me to 
believe that some argument, such as that given here, though usually slightly less formally 
presented, lies behind their conclusion. 
‘For simplicity we assume that the price of output remains unchanged throughout the 
analysis (the production technology is linear). The results are, however, more general. 
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We write the indirect utility function 
V= V(p, I) = max U(C, L) 
(4 
s.t. pc 5 L + I. 
There is no lump-sum taxation, and no profits, so income apart from that 
generated by work is zero;’ hence, I =O. We can easily derive the individual’s 
consumption function, using Roy’s identity: 
c = C(P, 4 = - V,(P, wxP> 0 
Assume, for simplicity, there are two identical individuals. We wish to 
maximize social welfare by choosing a probability distribution of tax rates on 
consumption. We focus on the simplest case where one individual will face a 
low tax rate and the other individual will face a high tax rate. We randomize 
the taxes, so each individual has exactly an equal chance of facing the high 
tax rate (p* - l), and the low tax rate (pB - 1). Thus, his expected utility can 
be written as 
w= VP*> 0) + UPB> 0) 
2 ’ 
(3) 
Since the two individuals are identical, maximizing ex ante expected utility is 
equivalent to maximizing social welfare using any individualistic social 
welfare criterion. Moreover, if we use a‘ utilitarian criterion, maximizing ex 
ante expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the sum of (ex post) utilities, 
i.e. 
vAtpA, 0) + VB(PB, O), 
where superscripts A and B refer to the different individuals. 
In either interpretation, we need to maximize W subject to the constraint 
that the government raise the requisite revenue: 
(p* - 1) C*(p*, 0) + (p” - 1) CB(pB, 0) 2 R. (4) 
‘The result extends to the case where there is lump-sum taxation but distortionary taxation is 
also employed. Thus, the results may be extended in a straightforward way to linear income tax 
schedules. See below, section 3.7. 
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3.2. Derivation of sufficient conditions for randomization 
The indifference curves in (pA,p”) space may be concave or convex. The 
slope of the indifference curve is 
We can calculate the curvature 







p = - VrrY/Vr, the elasticity of marginal utility of income,” 
c = -(d In C/d In p)v, the compensated price elasticity, 
Y =pC, ‘income’, 
q = (dC/dl) (Y/C), ‘income’ elasticity of consumption. 
The derivation of (7) is given in appendix A. 
The constraint curve (the set of values of p* and pR satisfying (4)) also may 
be either convex or concave. Its slope is 
CR + (p” - l)Ci 
P+(pA-1)C;t’ 
Using (8) we calculate its curvature as 
2CR+(pH- l)CH 2CA+(pA- 1)CA r$)R= -( c:+@_ I)$+ c:+(~A_ 1)~; 
(8) 
(9) 
‘In risk analysis this is known as the measure of (relative income) risk aversion. In the 
analysis of income inequality, it is sometimes referred to as the measure of inequality aversion. 
See Arrow (1970), Pratt (1964), and Atkinson (1970). 
(ZI) 
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Multiplying (11) through by 1 --z!(E + 17) and collecting terms, we establish: a 




‘OThis is also a necessary condition for the desirability of a ‘small’ randomization; it is 
possible, however, that although ‘small’ randomizations are undesirable, large randomizations 
are, as illustrated in Fig. 2c. 
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The larger the revenue to be raised (4 and the more negative the curvature 
of the demand function, the more likely is random taxation to be desirable. 
Let us consider the two polar cases: 
(a) At F=O, randomization is never desirable. 
(b) At the maximum feasible revenue, if demand is elastic (q + E > 1) 
Hence from (12) and recalling the definitions of E, q, and v, we obtain a 
sufficient condition for the desirability of randomization for suf$ciently high 
values of revenue is” 
or 




3.3. An example 
An example may help illustrate the conditions under which randomization 
is desirable. Consider the indirect utility function 
_kp’-B+(L+Z)‘-y 
1-B 1 l-y ’ $‘>O, 







“When T=Q*, randomization is, of course, not desirable, since increasing T lowers revenue. 
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where s=pC/(Z+I) is the share of ‘full income’ spent on consumption goods, 
and m = - (&“/@) (I + L). We require that individuals be risk averse (m > - y). 





or, if sm> - 1, 
z^> 1+ smlB 
I+sm. 
In particular $ the price elasticity of consumption is less than unity 
and m < 0 for sufficiently large revenues, randomization is desirable, 
3.4. Intuitive interpretation in terms of excess burden 
The basic intuition behind our argument can be seen as follows. In fig. 3a 
we have plotted the excess burden (EB) (deadweight loss) imposed on an 
individual as a function of the revenue raised from him. Clearly, if the curve 
is concave at the required revenue, R, it pays to introduce some 
randomization, for then average excess burden will be reduced. Thus, a 
sufficient condition for random taxation to be desirable is that 
dlnEB dlnEB dlnR =------ ~ 
dln R dlnz I dlnz 
=(%J 1 +;%I< 1, 
where F ,EB,r=dln EB/d In r is the elasticity of excess burden with respect to 




As fig. 3b illustrates, the percentage increment in excess 
increase in the tax rate will be small if the consumption 
convex. 
burden from an 
demand curve is 




p+2r - - - - - - 







These conditions can perhaps be interpreted more easily in terms of a tax 
on labor. Let t be the tax on labor, and L be labor supply. Then we obtain 
as before that randomization is desirable if 
dlnEB dlnEB 
d In R 
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i.e. the elasticity of the excess burden with respect to the tax rate is less than 
one plus the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the tax rate. 
Notice that it is the uncompensated elasticities which are relevant here, for 
it is the uncompensated elasticities which are critical in determining the 
shape of the revenue function. 
3.5. An alternative interpretation 
There is an alternative interpretation that will prove useful in some of the 
subsequent discussion. In fig. 4 we have depicted the relationship between the 
revenue raised from an individual (by means of a proportional consumption 
tax) and the utility he attains. (The curve is derived from plotting, in the 
lower right-hand quadrant, the relationship between the revenue raised and 
the tax rate, and in the upper left-hand quadrant, the relationship between the 
utility attained and the tax rate). This utilityyrevenue curve may not be 
concave; clearly, if it is not, we can increase average utility by concavifying 
the curve (as in the diagram). To collect the average revenue R, it is optimal 
to collect the revenue R, from some individuals and the revenue R, from 
others. 
3.6. The optimal randomization scheme 
So far, we have established that some randomization may be preferable to no 
randomization. We now analyze the optimal random tax structure. Let F(T) 
be the proportion of individuals assigned a tax rate less than or equal to Z. 
Then we seek that F(z) function which 
St. 
max j I’( 1 + z, O)dF(r) 
s zC(1 + z, 0) dF(r) 1 i?, 
(15) 
(lea) 
j dF(z) = 1. (16b) 
Letting ,U and y be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints, 
we obtain 
V( 1 + r, 0) + /EC( 1 + z, 0) = y, for all z with positive density, 
V(1 + z, 0) + pzC(l + z, 0) < y, otherwise. (17) 
We now prove there exists an optimal probability distribution of positive 
density at at most two points. 
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Assume not. There are then at least three tax rates, z1 <z2 <z3 with 
relative frequency xi, Eni= 1, yielding revenues (per capita) of R,, for an 
average revenue i?, with R, CR < R,, and yielding utility levels K, with 
average utility level K V, > v> V,. From (17), I/; is a linear function of Ri. 
Hence, the same level of expected utility could be attained simply by 
randomizing among z1 and z3, with 
The result is obvious, of course, from the concavification of the utility- 









3.7. Randomization of optimal linear income taxes 
In the simple model we have developed here, with identical individuals, 
there is no real reason to impose a distortionary tax: a unijorm lump-sum tax 
would clearly be prefereable. It is only because individuals differ, say, in their 
abilities, but these differences are not directly observable, that we need to 
resort to distortionary taxation. [See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980)]. Our 
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analysis can easily be extended to show that the optimal linear tax structure 
involves randomization of the marginal tax rate on consumption. 
To see this, assume we have a distribution of individuals by ability (before 
tax real wage) given by G(w).” With a linear tax structure, the individual’s 
budget constraint is given by 
C=1+(1 -t)wL, 
where I is the lump-sum payment to each individual and is 
as a function 
P= P(w( 1 t), I). 
is by his 
as 
before, a rate of a rate of t”. The 
government wishes to 
max I 
{I.r4.t? 2 
l^v(w(l -t”),I)dG(w)+~~(w(l -t”,Z)dG(w) 1 
subject to the budget constraint 
$S[fAWL(W(l -tA),I)+r “wL(w( 1 - tH), I)] dG(w) = I + R, 
where R is the government’s expenditure (per capita) on public goods (taken 
to be fixed). 
The analysis proceeds exactly as before. We take (for the moment) I to be 
fixed. Then tA= tH is always a critical point, but it may be a local minimum 
rather than a local maximum. We can derive expressions analogous to (13) 
and (14) ~ but now involving appropriately weighted averages of the 
demand elasticities, risk aversions, etc. ~ providing sufficient conditions for 
randomization. 
There is one problem with the implementation of the kind of random tax 
scheme we have described in this section. Since whether the individual will 
be faced with a low or a high tax rate is an insurable risk with no moral 
hazard associated with it, clearly individuals would be willing to purchase 
insurance to reduce this risk. If perfect insurance were purchased, the 
individual’s behavior would be identical to that with no randomization, and 
“For a more extended discussion of optimal linear tax structure, in the absence of 
randomization, see Stiglitz (1976~). 
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obviously then randomization would have no effect. Thus, it is apparent that 
social optimality requires, in this case, restrictions on the set of insurance 
markets which are allowed to operate.’ 3 
4. Randomization of taxes after labor decision 
The reason that random taxation was desirable in the previous section 
was, roughly, that the amount of revenue raised increased more than 
proportionately to the tax because of the dijjferences in response of labor 
supply to different after tax wages. Thus, the average tax rate could be 
reduced by having some individuals face a high tax rate and some a low rate. 
In this section we consider the case where the individual must decide on 
his labor input prior to knowing the tax. If the individual is risk averse, he 
will ‘plan’ on facing a high tax rate, and hence each individual will reduce his 
labor supply by less than he otherwise would; this enables the average tax 
rate to be reduced. Individuals are worse off because they face the risk 
arising from the random tax. They are better off because they face a lower 
average tax rate. We shall show that this second effect can dominate the first; 
randomization may increase everyone’s ex ante expected utility. 
It is more convenient in this section to take the tax as one on labor; the 
individual is assumed to face the tax rate t+d with probability 0.5, and t-A 
with probability 0.5, where A 20. Now, we take the price of output as our 
numeraire (p= 1). The individual chooses L to 
max 
U((w+d-t)L,L)+U((o-d-t)L,L)_W 
2 > (18) 
where w is the real wage rate. The revenue constraint is now 
tL=R. (19) 
Since individuals are all identical, maximizing the individual’s expected utility 
is equivalent (as before) to maximizing social welfare. 
13There may be no scope for insurance of the conventional kind (the individual pays so much 
to the insurance company if his tax rate is low, receiving some fixed amount if his tax rate is 
high). Whether such policies are desirable, and the nature of these policies, depends on the value 
of VP,. If Vp,=O, as it may (the marginal utility of income does not depend on the real wage), 
then there is no scope for such insurance contracts. If V,,,<O, then the insurance contract 
actually leads the individual with the higher tax rate to pay money to the individual with the 
lower tax rate. With normal demand curves, this would decrease the desirability of 
randomization of a consumption tax, since it will redistribute consumption away from highly 
taxed individuals. The insurance contracts may make randomization undesirable, and the 
government may need to intervene to restrict such insurance markets. 
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In appendix B we show that 
but that (differentiating 
l1 1 dA2 
where now we define 
-U11C 
p=u. 1 
Hence, as fig. 5 illustrates randomization is desirable if 
a2Lt --_ 
d2t aA2L -p 
dA2,E0 =aLt<o-t. 
l+tz 








The reduction in the tax rate depends on three factors, as follows. 
(a) The responsiveness of labor supply to risk. Variability in after-tax 
wages increases or decreases labor supply [Rothschild-Stiglitz (1971)], 
depending on the concavity or convexity of the first-order condition (U, o 
+ U, =0) in terms of the wage w. (The change in the after-tax wage is a 
mean-preserving spread in the wage distribution). Clearly, a necessary 
condition for the desirability of randomization is that risk increases labor 
supply (a2L/aA2 >O). (Below we provide conditions ensuring that this will 
occur). 
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(b) The responsiveness of labor supply to taxes. The more that an increase 
in taxes reduces labor supply, the greater the return from being able to 
reduce the (average) tax rate, and thus the more likely that randomization 
will be desirable. 
(c) The size of the required tax revenues R. When t =O, d2tldA2 =O; hence 
for sufficiently small tax revenues randomization is never desirable. 
To see the effect of large revenues, we observe that the denominator of (23) 
can be rewritten as 
(24) 
The value of t which maximizes revenues without randomization is denoted 
by t*, and the corresponding value of ii by R*. Thus, 
t* ;*=-_=I alnL 1 
W a Inelasticity of labor supply 
The maximal tax rate is the inverse of labor supply elasticity. 
Thus, ifrisk increases the labor supply and if there exists a maximal revenue 
without randomization of R*, for sufficiently high revenues, randomization is 
desirable, since 
d=t I I ~d=O+-a, as t--+t*. 
Indeed, for suflciently large government expenditures, the only way of 
raising the requisite revenue may be to randomize. For, if at t* randomization 
increases labor supply, clearly government revenue will be raised. 
4.1. Derivation of sufficient conditions for randomization in terms of utility 
functions 
To see more generally the conditions under which randomization is 
desirable, we need to express d2t/dA2 in terms of the utility function. 
Straightforward differentiating of the first-order conditions yields 
a% I 1 U,,,C(w-t)+2U,,L+Uz,,C -- aA Azo= U,,(o-t)2+2Uz1(0-t)+Uz2 
aL U~~L(W-t)+ u,,L+ u, - 
at d=o =Ul,(o-q2+2U2,(o-t)+U2,’ 
(26) 
(27) 
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Substituting (26) and (27) into (23) and that into (21), we obtain: 
d2W -U,L tU111 L(o-t)+2tU,,+tLU,,1 
dA2 +,,= l+~YInL/~lnt U,,(o-_)2+2Uz,(o-t)+U22 
+ u, 1 c. 
(28) 
The denominator of (26)-(28) is unambiguously negative (provided that the 
tax rate is below that which maximizes revenue). Hence, a sufficient condition 
for the desirability of randomization is that (from (21)), d2t/dA2 be large (and 
negative) relative to p; from (23) this will be the case if C?*L/C?A~ is large (and 
positive), which from (26), will be true if U 1 1 1 is positive and large. It is clear 
not only that U, 1 1 can be positive, but it can be very large, in which case 
randomization will be desirable (for t large enough). 
4.2. Separable utility Jhctions 
To get a better idea of the kinds of conditions under which randomization 
might be desirable, assume we had a separable utility function, so U2, = U,, 1 











A is the elasticity of p, the individual’s risk aversion. Substituting into (26) 
and (27) we obtain: 
(31) 
r?L (P- 1)L p= 
& (co-t)(p+O’ 
(32) 
Thus, randomization leads to increased labor supply if 
A>l-p 
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and increased taxation reduces the labor supply if 
p<l. 





Thus, with separability, if there is rapidly decreasing relative risk aversion (A 
is very large), randomization becomes desirable even at low tax rates. 
These results, like those of the preceding section, may seem rather 
counterintuitive: after all, one is imposing more risk on the individual. Yet, 
remarkably enough, the condition we have derived (in the simple case of 
separable utility functions) suggests that randomization may be attractive 
even with high risk aversion. 
There are two effects of randomization. First, it imposes a risk on 
individuals. By the usual kinds of arguments the welfare loss can be shown 
to be of the order of (for small risks) pA2/2. At the same time, it affects labor 
supply; the change in aggregate labor supply affects the (average) tax rate; 
changing the average tax rate changes the deadweight loss associated with 
the tax. The deadweight loss is approximately 
t2 c?L R2 aL 1 R2 w-t C?L 
.C J 2 am 2~2 am o~-R 2 L aI3 ’ 
Thus, the deadweight loss is inversely related (for constant elasticity supply 
functions of labor) to the aggregate labor supply. If aggregate supply 
increases when we randomize, i.e. if a2L/JA2>0 is sufficiently large, then the 
effect of the benefit from reduction in the average tax rate is greater than the 
loss from the induced risk. 
One interpretation of the kind of random taxation we have discussed in 
this section is the random enforcement of taxes. (Fixed costs of auditing 
increase the desirability of random audits). This interpretation has been 
discussed at greater length by Weiss (1976). 
5. The randomization of the optimal tax and optimal randomization 
In the preceding two sections we established the desirability of 
randomization for linear tax structures. In this section we ask: What can we 
say about optimal randomization of linear tax structures, on the one hand, 
and the randomization of optimal non-linear tax structures, on the other? 
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5.1. Optimal ex post randomization 
In subsection 3.6 we established that the optimal ex ante randomization 
(i.e. randomization before the individual has decided on his level of effort) 
required only two tax rates.14 Here, we show that ex post randomization 
entails only three tax rates. 
Formally, the government wishes to find a probability distribution of tax 
represented by F(t), which maximizes individuals’ expected utility subject to 
the government’s budget constraint, i.e. 
max max l U[(w - t)L, L] dF(t) 
L 1 (33) 
s.t. Lj t dF(t) 2 8, (344 
jdF(t)- 1. (34b) 
A necessary condition for this is that we maximize expected utility, given the 
labor supplied, i.e. from the individual’s first-order conditions for optimal L 
we have 
j[U,(c(,-t)+UJdF(t)=O. (35) 
Letting p be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint 
(34a), y be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (34b), and 
$ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (35), then 
U((w - t)L, L) + pLt + $[U,(w - t) + U,] = y, 
if t occurs with positive probability, (36a) 
U((c0 - t)L, L) + pLt + $[U,(o - t) + U,] 5 y, otherwise. (36b) 
To see that there need be at most three tax rates which occur with positive 
probability, assume the contrary, i.e. f, > t2 > t, > t4 all occur with positive 
probability. Letting 7ci = the relative frequency of ti, xi zi = 1. Define 
f$(t)=Ul(w--)+U~, (37) 
14The generalization of that result to n commodities and labor requires randomization among 
n + 1 tax structures. 
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u = c ni U((0 - ti) L, L). W) 
If {ti, t,, t,,t,} do in fact occur with relative frequency rri in the optimal 
random tax, it must be the case that {rci} is the solution to 
max 1 ti 71i, 
(X,) 
(39) 
s.t. c &) 7-ri = 4, Wa) 
c U((W - ti)L, L)n, = 0. (40’4 
Thus reformulated, this is simply a linear maximization problem subject to 
two linear constraints, and the result is immediate. 
5.2. Ex post and ex ante randomization 
In the two preceding sections we analyzed separately ex post and ex ante 
randomization. In fact, the optimal tax structure may entail both 
simultaneously; that is, individuals are told, before they decide on the level of 
effort, that they will face one of two random tax lotteries, one yielding, say, 
t*-A* with probability P* and t* + A* with probability 1 -P*, the other 
yielding rB--dB with probability pB and tB+ An with probability 1 -pB. Given 
that ex post randomization is desirable, the desirability of ex ante 
randomization may be analyzed exactly as before now, for each average level 
of tax, we calculate the optimal random distribution and the associate level 
of expected utility and average revenue. 
5.3. Randomization with optimal taxes 
This paper has focused on the desirability of randomization when the 
government is restricted to employing linear taxes. The question naturally 
arises: Is randomization desirable if this restriction is removed? Does 
randomization, for instance, arise simply because of the second best nature of 
the problem? 
On the contrary, it turns out that Pareto efficient taxation, with 
individuals differing say by ability as in the model of subsection 3.7, entails 
randomization under much weaker conditions than those derived in the 
preceding two sections. The use of randomization enables the government to 
distinguish between high and low ability individuals, at a lower cost (in terms 
of the distortions imposed). The analysis of this problem involves rather 
22 J.E. Stigiitz, Utiliturianism and horizontal equit) 
different techniques than those employed here, and hence is taken up 
elsewhere. [See Stiglitz (1982a)].t5 
6. Other contexts where utilitarianism implies horizontal inequity 
There have been several other contexts in which utilitarianism implies 
horizontal inequity, as follows. 
(a) The efficiency wage hypothesis. Mirrlees (1975) and Stiglitz (1976b) 
have analyzed the optimal distribution of income in a family farm in which 
the productivity of the individual depends on the wage he receives (the 
amount of food he consumes), as in fig. 6. Here L(o) gives the number of 
efficiency units supplied by an individual receiving a wage w. Optimality in 
general entails some individuals receiving a low wage, some a high wage. 
Indeed, introducing inequality may be ex post Pareto optimal. When 
everyone receives the same wage, they are all unproductive, and 
low. Giving a few individuals a lot more enables them to work so 
not only do they produce enough to provide the extra food 











(b) The optimal town. Mirrlees (1972) has shown that in the optimal town 
the utilitarian solution entails inequality: individuals who are randomly 
assigned to live further from the center enjoy more land and have a higher 
level of utility. By crowding individuals near the center, the transport costs of 
all those further out are reduced, and this gain in efftciency more than offsets 
the inequality generated thereby. 
(c) Fixed training costs. l6 Assume everyone is ex ante the same, and there 
are two types of jobs to be performed. One requires training costs T 
ISThis result is in fact, a special case of a more general theorem 
randomization in brincipal agent problems. See Stiglitz (1982b). 
about the desirability of 
leThis problem was discussed in Stiglitz (1973). A formal derivation of this result is contained 
in Stiglitz (1976a). 
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(denominated in say the labor numeraire). Thus, some individuals are 
(randomly) assigned to the high training cost industry, others to the low 
training cost industry. It can be shown that those individuals who are 
(randomly) assigned to the industry requiring training will, in the utilitarian 
optimum, work harder and have a lower level of utility. By making these 
individuals work harder, expenditures on training costs are reduced; in effect, 
net national product can be increased, at the cost of some increase in 
inequality. Unless society has infinite inequality aversion (using the Atkinson 
measure of inequality), it always pays to introduce some inequality. 
These examples have one feature in common: they lack, in one way or 
another, the concavity property which is required for utilitarianism to imply 
horizontal equity. In the lirst (‘efficiency wage’) problem, inequality in 
income raises net national product by increasing average productivity; in the 
third (training cost) problem, inequality in the labor required of different 
individuals raises net national product by reducing the expenditure on 
training cost; in the second (optimal city) problem, inequality in the 
allocation of land raises net national product by reducing total expenditure 
on transport costs. 
In some situations, lifetime equality may be attained, even though there is, 
at any moment, inequality. Thus, in the optimal town problem, if it were 
costless to move individuals, we could rotate individuals among plots of land 
so lifetime utilities were identical. But this is not possible for the training cost 
problem. In the optimal tax problem, if individuals can save, then again 
randomization may entail lifetime inequality. 
In all of the situations examined, randomization is Pareto optimal: ex ante 
expected utility is maximized by this kind of inequality. 
7. Markets and inequality 
It is thus not surprising that in situations such as those discussed in this 
paper but arising in market contexts, there will be a tendency for the market 
to introduce randomization. For instance, consider the problem of financing 
specific training costs. The efficient way for the firm to recover those training 
costs is to impose, in effect, a lump-sum tax on all workers, but this may not 
be desirable; if individuals do not know their ability prior to training, they 
would prefer an ‘income tax’, i.e. a piece rate less than the value added.” 
Assume, for administrative reasons, that the piece rate cannot be made a 
function of the number of items produced (i.e. we must have a linear income 
“The parallel between ‘income taxes’ and ‘piece rates’ is discussed at greater length in Stiglitz 
(1975). 
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tax). I8 Then equilibrium may entail a random piece rate. Perhaps this 
provides part of the explanation of random promotion policies (equivalent to 
random wages) used by some universities. 
Note that so long as individuals have a free choice of occupations, the 
wage contract must entail individuals who are ex ante identical receiving the 
same level of expected utility. 
(Similarly, a developer developing a new residential town and selling off 
the plots of land, could be better off (i.e. increase his profits) by having a 
fixed fee for a plot, having the plots of different sizes, and randomly assigning 
individuals to a plot). 
In the kind of situations we have depicted, the market allocation may not 
be Pareto efficient for two reasons. First, it may be difficult to enforce 
random contracts; in the example described earlier, with fixed training costs, 
the worker who receives training works harder, but receives the same wage 
as the one who does not receive training. In such a situation there is 
obviously an incentive for some other firm to bid the worker away. If it is 
not possible to restrict labor mobility, then the market equilibrium will 
require that all (ex ante identical) individuals receive the same level of utility 
(ex post); the market, in these situations, entails excessive egalitarianism. 
Second, in the training cost problem presently under consideration, the 
optimal resource allocation requires, in effect, subsidies from the trained 
workers to the untrained, or conversely. As we noted above, if there were a 
single government-controlled firm, it would pay equal wages to all workers, 
but randomly assign some workers to the plant not requiring training and 
some to the plant requiring training. It would require that the latter workers 
work harder (longer). Although the workers so assigned might well complain, 
the ex ante expected utility of all workers is maximized by this 
randomization. But the utilitarian allocation is not, in general, viable under 
competition. For in general the revenues raised from the sale of one 
commodity will not be equal to the expenditures on wages plus training 
costs: there will be a subsidy in one direction or the other. It is obvious, 
then, that the equilibrium cannot be sustained by a laissez-faire competitive 
equilibrium.” 
8. Random pricing by regulated and non-regulated monopolies 
It is by now well recognized that there is a close relationship between the 
analysis of optimal tax structures [Ramsey (1927) and his descendants] and 
“This assumption is not essential; it is made only to convert the problem at hand directly 
into one which is equivalent to that analyzed in section 3. More generally, it would appear that 
even if non-linear piece rates were admissible. randomization may be desirable, but we have not 
analyzed the conditions under which this will be true. 
191;or proof see Stiglitz (1976a). 
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the analysis of optimal pricing of public utilities [Boiteux (1956) and his 
descendants]. Thus, our remarks about the desirability of random taxes 
applv directly to the problem of pricing of regulated utilities. 
But our analysis also shows that there are conditions under which an 
unregulated monopolist may find randomization desirable. We noted above, 
for instance, that the maximization of government revenue may entail 
randomization of prices (tax rates). Thus, if production were controlled by a 
single monopolist, he would, in these circumstances, randomize his prices. 
Similarly, the optimal entry deterring strategy for a monopolist may entail 
randomizing his prices.” 
Consider a monopolistic firm wishing to maximize its revenue; assume it 
has a long-term contract with its customers; the contract specifies the ‘price 
distribution’ which it will charge (the commodity is assumed not to be 
storable). The customer has a reservation expected utility level, i.e. at any 
contract yielding a lower level of expected utility, he purchases a substitute 
for the given commodity.” 
Then the problem of the monopolist is maximizing revenue subject to this 
expected utility constraint as opposed to our problem, which entails 
maximizing expected utility, subject to a revenue constraint. Formally, the 
two problems are simply dual to each other. Thus, under perfectly analogous 
conditions to those presented here, the monopolist will find it desirable to 
randomize his prices. 
9. Implications of our analysis for the theory of optimal taxation and the 
usefulness of the concept of horizontal equity 
Most of the literature on the theory of optimal taxation [surveyed in 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)] has focused on characterizing first-order 
conditions for the maximization of social welfare. Our analysis has made it 
clear that this may be insufficient: under not unreasonable circumstances 
these may characterize a local minimum rather than a maximum. 
Although we have formulated the problem in terms of two absolutely 
identical individuals, the issues we have raised arise, in slightly disguised 
form, in the standard optimal tax problem. Consider, for instance, two 
individuals, one of whom likes brown ice cream (but obtains zero utility from 
white), the other of whom likes white ice cream. Assume they have identical 
demand functions. Assume moreover that the costs of production of white 
and brown ice creams are identical. Thus, if z,, is the tax rate on brown ice 
cream, z, that on white ice cream, then in the conventional optimal tax 
problem there may be three critical points, at T~=T’,, at z,> zw, and at 
“See Salop (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Gilbert and Stiglitz (1979) for more 
general discussions of entry deterrence. 
“Newbery (1978) has explored one version of this application of our general model. 
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5h < T,. One might well consider solutions with z,#z, horizontally 
inequitable, but such a solution may be a local utilitarian maximum. The 
optimal tax structure is, in any reasonable sense, horizontally inequitable. 
Many economists would, accordingly, reject the asymmetric solution in 
which the two colors of ice cream are treated differently. Presumably, a true 
believer in utilitarianism would not. 
But let us now assume that there are, within the population, two groups of 
individuals distinguished, say, only by hair color. Recall that above we 
showed then there were two alternative interpretations of our results. We 
focused on the situation where we treated all individuals ex ante identically, 
and thus randomization was (ex ante) Pareto optimal; but even if type A 
individuals always were taxed at a higher rate, and type B individuals always 
were taxed at a lower rate, social welfare (using the utilitarian criterion) was 
increased as a result of taxing them at different rates. A strict utilitarian 
would thus have no way of choosing between a tax system which randomized 
taxes (resulting in identical ex ante expected utility) and one which always 
taxed light haired individuals at a lower rate than dark haired individuals; 
moreover, under the conditions provided in the earlier analysis, he would 
argue that a tax system which differentiated between light haired and dark 
haired individuals is preferable to one which did not. 
Is there a difference between the analysis of the tax treatment of ‘brown’ 
and ‘white’ ice cream lovers, and the fair haired and dark haired individuals 
with identical labor supply functions? The question, seemingly, hinges on 
what are admissible distinctions. But there is, within the utilitarian 
framework as it has customarily been applied to the analysis of tax 
structures, no way of determining what are and are not admissible 
distinctions. If hair color or sex is not admissible, why should a seemingly 
equally capricious aspect of an individual, the color which he likes his ice 
cream, be the basis of differentiation? If the preferred color is not an 
admissible basis, should the preferred flavor - chocolate versus vanilla ~ be 
admissible? And if the choice among ice creams is not admissible, should the 
choice between ice cream and cheese be an admissible” basis, or the choice 
between goods and leisure? These issues have always been lurking quietly in 
the background in the analytical discussions of the structure of taxation; the 
point of the simple models presented in the first two sections of the paper is 
to examine a context in which they cannot be avoided, to present them in as 
pristine a form as possible. 
There are, at this juncture, three approaches that can be taken. 
(1) One can argue that any distinction is admissible; discrimination may 
well be optimal. 
“The fact that the technology for producing two colors of ice cream may be identical, while 
the technologies for producing cheese and ice cream are different, does not, 1 think, provide a 
persuasive basis for differentiation. 
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(2) Alternatively, one can define a set of admissible distinctions. This 
unfortunately removes one of the great advantages of the utilitarian 
approach to the analysis of tax structures; it presumes the existence of a 
prior principle for the determination of the set of admissible bases of 
differentiation. How are we to know, then, that this prior principle should 
not, at the same time, be reflected in the design of the tax structure itself? 
The same criticism can, of course, be levied against the principle of 
horizontal equity itself. This is usually put as requiring that ‘people in equal 
positions should be treated equally.. .’ [Musgrave (1959)]. But what is meant 
by ‘equal positions’: are chocolate and vanilla ice cream lovers in equal 
positions? Again, it would appear that the critical question is: What are 
admissible distinctions? The principle of horizontal equity seems to provide 
little guidance. As Rosen (1978) has pointed out: ‘Customarily, “equal 
positions” are defined in terms of some observable index of ability to pay 
such as income, expenditure, or wealth.’ But to choose say income or wealth 
as the basis is virtually equivalent to defining income as the horizontal 
equitable tax; differential commodity taxes are, by definition, then horizontally 
inequitable. 
This approach attempts to define ‘equal positions’ in terms of some 
opportunity sets (income or wealth are used as surrogates for ‘ability to pay’). 
In contrast, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Feldstein (1976) have taken a 
‘welfare approach’. As Feldstein has put it: 
If two individuals would be equally well off (have the same utility level) in 
the absence of taxation, they should be equally well off if there is taxation. 
[Furthermore,] taxes should not alter the utility ordering. 
But this formulation too is not completely persuasive: first, it requires a 
higher level of cardinality in the utility assessment even than that required by 
the utilitarian approach. We must be able to compare levels of utility as well 
as differences. Second, let us consider what this definition implies for our 
chocolate-vanilla ice cream example. If initially the chocolate and vanilla ice 
cream sell at the same price, then differential taxation is horizontally 
inequitable. Gut now, assume that the cost of chocolate is increased slightly. 
The chocolate lover is ‘disadvantaged’. The Feldstein formulation suggests not 
only that we could not use the tax system to attempt to restore ‘equality’ but 
that any taxes we impose must result (if it is to be horizontally equitable) in 
chocolate lovers being worse off than vanilla lovers. For example, assume that 
the supply elasticity of chocolate is greater than that of vanilla. A uniform 
lump-sum tax might therefore result, in the new general equilibrium, in the 
price of chocolate being below that of vanilla. In the Feldstein definition, the 
uniform lump-sum tax (which, given that all individuals have the same 
endowments, would in the conventional formulation be horizontally 
equitable) is thus horizontally inequitable. 
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In either formulation, virtually any tax system will have some degree of 
horizontal inequity; one needs, then, to trade off horizontal equity with other 
desiderata of a good tax system. One needs, then, a meta-principle for 
evaluating tax systems.23 
(3) Finally, we can attempt to retain the utilitarian approach, but argue 
that the particular formulation in the current optimal tax literature is 
inadequate. The governments -- the individuals who are in the possession of 
the power to exercise the power to tax - are not likely to impose a truly 
random tax. The existence of differential treatment means that there will be 
incentives to bribe (in one way or another) those in the power to determine 
who is to be treated favorably. It is this belief in the corruptability of power 
which may have provided the motivation for the restriction on differential 
treatment in the American constitution. These considerations are, I think, 
relevant in assessing alternative tax codes, e.g. in the desirability of taxing 
different commodities at the same or different rates. 
The dangers of differentiation lie not only in the favorable treatment that 
may be - and has been - obtained by special interest groups. Admitting 
the possibility that some commodity may be taxed at a higher rate opens up 
the possibility of using the tax system as an instrument for the (possibly 
mistaken) public wrath against one industry or another. 
Thus, a utilitarian, assessing the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative tax systems, should take into account how such systems would 
actually be implemented. It is within such a broader perspective that some 
form of the principle of horizontal equity may well be consistent with 
utilitarianism.24 
10. Rawls and horizontal equity 
Some readers have suggested that there is a close relationship between the 
principle of horizontal equity and Rawls’ principle of justice. And just as 
Rawls argues that justice takes precedence over other social principles, so too 
should horizontal equity. Thus, one should not trade off horizontal equity 
with other social objectives. 
But our analysis has shown that each individual’s expected utility may be 
higher if he is confronted with a random tax structure. Thus, behind the veil 
‘3There are ad hoc approaches defining an index of horizontal inequity and an index of 
vertical equity, and positing a social welfare function giving tradeoffs between the two. This 
seems close to assuming what is to be analyzed. The index used by King (1980) seems open to 
the objections made above. 
“1f this view is correct, then the kind of analysis of horizontal equity contained in Feldstein, 
Rosen and King may not be focusing on the critical issues. Within a general equilibrium context, 
changes in taxes ~ like changes in technology ~ affect different individuals very differently. 
Welfare rankings ~ if they could be defined ~ may well be reversed. But there is nothing 
sacred about the pre-tax ranking. What we are concerned with is some notion of arhitrar~ 
distinctions. 
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of ignorance, each would favor random taxation if he could be assured that 
the tax would be truly levied in a random way. 
But the individual may not believe that the tax would be levied in a truly 
random way. Indeed, aware of the corruptability of government, he might 
reason that if the Constitution allows differential taxation (of commodities, 
individuals, etc.) then the political process will result in some individual being 
advantaged relative to others, simply because of their ability to exercise 
political power. Thus, differentiation would clearly violate the principle of 
justice. And because it may not be possible to write the Constitution in such 
a way that it would allow just differentiation, but that it would not allow 
unjust differentiation, it may be preferable simply to restrict the ability of the 
government to impose differential taxation.25 
11. Concluding remarks 
This paper has established that, far from being able to derive the principle 
of horizontal equity from utilitariansm, the principle is actually inconsistent 
with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances; most notably, we have 
derived conditions under which random taxation is optimal. Indeed, there 
are potentially important economic situations where Pareto optimality and 
horizontal equity are inconsistent (in both an ex ante and ex post sense). 
Such inconsistencies force us to re-evaluate our ethical principles: either 
utilitarianism or the principle of horizontal equity - at least in the 
conventional forms - must be abandoned. We have suggested a more 
general utilitarian approach, within which the two principles may be 
consistent, but which, at the same time, casts considerable doubt on the 
optimality of the kinds of tax structures which have been derived within the 
conventional utilitarian framework. 
Appendix A 
Derivation of curvature of indifference curve (section 3). 
To show that at p* = pB, 
= -$p-a-2q], 
“This still leaves a number of questions unresolved: is non-differentiation consistent with all 
consumption being taxed at the same rate, or with all income being taxed at the same rate; the 
former is equivalent to a wage tax, and thus implies that interest is exempt from taxation, while 
the latter is equivalent to a tax on future consumption at a higher rate than on a tax on present 
consumption. 
JPE-B 
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we make use of Roy’s formula 
V,= -cl+ 
Differentiating with respect to I we obtain: 
vpr= -g v,-cv,,, 
while differentiating with respect to p we obtain 
substituting (A2) into (A3) we obtain: 
\ 
vpp= - ( c v,-c: v,-c”v,, . ap ) 
Using the Slutsky equation, we have: 






which, with some rearrangement, yields (7). 
Appendix B: Analysis of ex post randomization 





Differentiating Wwith respect to d, we obtain: 
dW U,[(~+~--~)L,L]L-C’,[(~--~~~I)L,L]L( CiWdL 
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To evaluate this, we need to calculate 
dt R dL 
dA ,G, L?dA’ 
(B3) 






Since the denominator is positive for efficient levels of taxation, dt/dA is of 
opposite sign to aLlad. 




=O, when A=O. (W 
At A =0 the first term of (B2) is obviously zero; the second term is zero since 
utility maximization implies 
awIaL=o, 037) 
and the third term is zero since, from (B5) and (B6), dt/dA = 0. 
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Similarly, 




dU,[(o+A-t)L,L]L dU,[(o-A-t)L,L]L dL 








+U&o+A-t)L,L]L? +U,,[(o-A-t)L,L]p dt 2 
‘I 
L C-1 dA 
aWd2L d2W dL Z2Wdt dL 
+aLZF+ aLdA dA + aLi% dA dA ’ 
The second, fourth and sixth terms are zero at A =O; the ninth term is zero 
because of (B7); the third, fifth and tenth are zero because of (B6), and the 
sixth, eighth and eleventh are zero because at A =O, dt/dA = 0 (from (B5) and 
(B6)). 
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